Marx and science: afterthoughts

I wrote in the last post that Marx's definition of ideology as "false consciousness" makes sense only within the context of a logical opposition between (subjective) falsity and (objective) truth, the latter paradigmatically instantiated by the methods and theories of natural science. If this bifurcation is done away with, then the concept is voided of meaning.

Now, this thesis might be construed as endorsing Althusser's infamous claim that there is a "break" between the "ideological" ingredients of Marx's thought (typically associated with the earlier work) and the supposedly "hard science" of the later writings. But such an interpretation of my suggestions would be utterly misguided. The reason for this is that for all the obsessive repetition of the mantra of "science" in connection with Marx's theories, Althusser's use of the word "science" is, firstly, pure homonymy (in Aristotle's sense): i.e. the same sound (word-sign) is employed in order to denote something which has nothing to do with what is generally understood as scientific procedure.

Althusser does not (care to) understand what science is in the ordinary sense (in the sense that Marx himself understood it). Instead, he surreptitiously substitutes an understanding all of his own, which if spelled out in plain terms is straightaway convicted by its own presposterousness. According to this fanciful notion "science" amounts to the theories contained in certain selected works of Marx as interpreted by Althusser himself. "Truth", thus, resides in certain "canonical" texts as interpreted by the authoritative exegete. This is Talmudism pure and simple. The scripturae auctoritas is thus raised in opposition both to common sense empirical knowledge of facts as well as to all other interpretations (including Marxist interpretations) of his chosen texts (and the totality of Marx's oeuvre). Surely we can recognize here the gist of Augustine's epistemology, which was the staple of the schooling that our "scientific Marxist" received during his youthful stint at the seminary.

The most egregious feature of the Althusserian account is a sustained polemic against "formal logic", common sense and empiricism: all three are terms of abuse. That science in any intellible sense cannot possibly subsist without the above elements is disdainfully left out of the discussion. To the extent that one can follow its abstruse verbiage Althusserism is, thus, a fanatic denunciation of science rather that its defense. It is not accidental, therefore, that "post modern Marxism" (a silly contradiction in terms, anyway) as spawned by Althusser's verbal abracadabra is saturated with a hatred of the scientific spirit and its core pre-requisites such as intersubjective testability, factual adequacy, falsifiability, epistemological equality with your dialectical opponent etc.

It is, however, instructive to note that their rejection of empiricism does not employ the standard criticisms of empiricist epistemology with which the philosophy of science is replete. Of these they are unaware. Their anti-empiricism is premised on purely political considerations: to be an empiricist means to be a political conservative, where "conservative" means not to be a Marxist (which is the only "scientific" world-view). The circularity of this is worse than puerile.

Furthermore, they do not get that their ignorant raving against empiricism actually undermines their own dogmata. For through pure epistemological empiricism one can very well reach the position that they want to espouse, namely that all theory is ideology pure and simple sustained only by political power. Experience is the world as perceived from the standpoint of a certain individual or collective subject: esse est percipi. Their claim that only Marxism is true is based upon the alleged fact that it expresses precisely the experience of the proletariat and that it will triumph when the power of that class is brought to bear upon social conditions. Thus, by discrediting empiricism you ipso fact saw off the branch that your proud Althuserism is sitting on. Since no other comprehensible epistemology is supplied, apart from unfathomable talk based on the notion that logic has no value (or in other words that anyone upholding the tertium non datur principle is a despicable counter-revolutionary who does not deserve to exist), then we must conclude that the Althusserian enterprise amounts to nothing more than a glorious exercise in self-nullification.

A significant sleight of hand in all this is the identification tout court of theory with practice. Philosophy is supposedly "philosophical practice". This shibboleth may mean a number of things, all of them wrong. It may imply that theoretical insight (ideological conviction) can make or create the world of reality in accordance with its visions. This is another age-old theological fallacy: facts that do not conform to the demands of ideological faith (or individuals that uphold these facts) do not exist -or do not deserve to exist. Only philosophy (more precisely, only the "true" philosophy possessed by "us") has the right to declare what the world is. There is no natural or human (social) world outside the webs of concepts spun by theory.

Alternatively, that dictum may mean that there is no self-contained world of ideas -apart from those ideas which the physical power of victorious social groups allows to exist because they serve their practical purposes (wealth and power). If there are ideas which cannot be pressed into the service of the political interests of the dominant groups (or individuals upholding these ideas), then they ought to be destroyed. Individuals and their idea(l)s have no inherent theoretic (and hence ontological) worth. They are mere "place-holders" in "structures". Only those idea(l)s have the right to exist that serve the "good" structure as the only "true" theory (the one held by "us") defines it. It all coheres in one appalling, groundless circle of empty talk.

So all in all, this stupefying conceit of the Theoretician-as-God has absolutely nothing to do with good old Marx and his rather common sense idea of science taken from the real scientific activity and achievement of his time. In Marx's idea of science empiricism is indeed the only epistemological means of getting at reality as it is in itself. In this view of science empiricism is indispensable, but science does not end with empiricism (which in and of itself is solipsistic and relativist, and only to be rescued from these traps by a theistic postulate in the manner of Berkeley and Descartes). Scientific empiricism is underpinned by a realist metaphysic, namely the belief that there is indeed an objective world separate from and ontologically independent from our theories, whose truth depends upon whether they allow us to make a connection with this self-contained sphere of objective Being. Now, how this is possible is a mightily vexed issue in the philosophy of real science -as opposed to that caricature of pseudo-science the Althusserians specialize in. It is also extremely problematic how one can apply this understanding of science to historical knowledge -as Marx too readily assumed. And this is of course the reason for Marx's endless vacillation between a positivist and a historicist model of knowledge. There is indeed a tortured confusion about these issues in the very heart of Marxian theory. But this confusion derived from too great a respect for natural science as practiced by real scientists. And it is an insult to call "Marxist" the obscurantist mysticism of our structuralist and post-structuralist friends with its rabid hatred, born of utter ignorance, of the scientific spirit.